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Overcorrecting jury instruction errors
n November, a state
appellate court threw out
the first-degree murder
conviction of Daniel
Belknap, who had been
found guilty in the beating death
of a young girl in 2006.
The Illinois Supreme Court is
now deciding whether to hear a
challenge to that decision in
order to clarify the law on “plain
error” review. It should.
People v. Belknap is important
because, as the state argues,
some appellate courts are misapplying plain-error doctrine.
Beyond that, the case is significant because it highlights the
dubious value of recent Supreme
Court case law on how trial
courts conduct voir dire.
Hidden in this case are lessons
for prosecutors, defense
attorneys and judges who must
live with the new voir dire rules.
Belknap was arrested after the
5-year-old daughter of his girlfriend died of blunt force trauma
to the head.
Based on the autopsy and
timeline of events, both the prosecution and defense agreed the
death was a homicide and that
only two people could have
committed it — the defendant or
the girl’s mother.
The evidence against Belknap
was not overwhelming. Most
important were the statements
of two jailhouse snitches who
claimed Belknap told them he
had killed the girl in a methinduced rage after she threatened to reveal his drug use.
Belknap was twice convicted
of first-degree murder, but the
convictions were tossed each
time because the trial court
failed during voir dire to comply
precisely with Supreme Court
Rule 431(b).
The rule requires the court to
“ask each potential juror”
whether she “understands and
accepts” four principles: The
defendant is presumed innocent;
the state must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt; the
defendant need not offer

I

evidence on his own behalf; and
his failure to testify can’t be held
against him.
In addition, jurors must be
given an “opportunity to respond
to specific questions concerning
[these] principles.”
At the first trial, the court
explained the four principles
thoroughly but offered no opportunity to respond.
On remand, the court failed to
ask the venire persons whether
they “understood and accepted”
the principles, instead asking
only if they “agreed with” or “had
any quarrel with” them. Defense
counsel objected to none of this.
Because defense counsel failed
to object during voir dire,
reversal was appropriate only if
the trial court committed “plain
error.”
This is supposed to provide a
heightened standard of review,
because without an objection,
the judge wasn’t given a chance
to correct his error at trial.
To merit a new trial for an
unpreserved objection, the
defendant must prove either 1)
“the evidence in a case is so
closely balanced that the jury’s
guilty verdict may have resulted
from the error and not the
evidence” or 2) “the error is so
serious that the defendant was
denied a substantial right, and
thus a fair trial.” People v. Herron
(2005).
Concerning the latter prong,
the Supreme Court has already
determined that 431(b) errors do
not in themselves deny defendants a fair trial.
As for the first prong of the
plain-error test, most courts
recognize that reversal in
“closely balanced” cases is
appropriate only where the
defendant proves the error may
really have caused the guilty
verdict. It doesn’t matter if the
error was de minimis, so long as
it may have caused harm.
Here’s where the Belknap
court went astray. The panel
concluded there was a 431(b)
error (indisputable under
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current case law), and that the
evidence in the case was closely
balanced (plausible, given the
state’s reliance on jailhouse
snitches). But the court
required no showing by the
defendant that the voir dire
error itself may have accounted
for the verdict.
Indeed, that would be very
hard to do where the only error
was the trial court’s failure to use
a couple of magic words in its
rigorous discussion of relevant
legal principles.
This wasn’t a case where a link
between the error and the
verdict was likely — such as
where a defendant chooses not
to testify and the court fails to
tell the venire he has that right.
The Belknap court simply
misunderstood plain-error
doctrine.
Under the panel’s theory, in
close cases, a forfeited claim of
error could more easily lead to a
new trial than a claim that was
preserved by counsel. That’s
because the defendant, under the
panel’s theory, need not show the
forfeited claims may have caused
the guilty verdict.
If the claim had been
preserved, in contrast, there
would be a new trial only if the
state failed to show the error was
harmless. That’s screwy, and the
Supreme Court should set them
straight.

There’s another issue lurking
here concerning whether the
kind of voir dire questioning in
cases such as Belknap is really
erroneous at all. In fact, until
recently, decisional law was clear
that trial courts were permitted
to ask in their own words
whether prospective jurors had
any quarrel with the 431(b) principles. See People v. Thompson
(2010).
To be sure, there’s some virtue
in encouraging uniform language
to communicate the 431(b) principles.
But should it really be considered an error for a court to
express them in its own
language?
Requiring magic words
typically creates perverse incentives. As a defense lawyer, if you
believe the court’s voir dire was
adequate to weed out biased
jurors, then under current law
there’s no real reason for you to
object if the court didn’t use the
“understand and accept” formulation from the rule.
By objecting, at best you would
force the court to rephrase its
questions during voir dire, which
would be of limited or no value to
your client. But by keeping quiet,
you will hand your client a
potential “get out of jail free”
card, since in a closely balanced
case the trial court’s error might
buy him a reversal for plain error
on appeal.
What are the lessons here?
Judges should start using a
script that incorporates 431(b)’s
precise language during voir
dire. Defense counsel should
consider standing mute if the
court fails to use the rule’s magic
words.
And prosecutors should insist,
even without prompting from the
defense, that the trial court read
straight from the rule.
Finally, the Supreme Court
should reconsider whether it’s
really erroneous for a trial court
to convey the sum and substance
of Rule 431(b) in its own
language.
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